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MMBA503 QUESTION 1
What is the objective of regulation?
THE REGULATORY OBJECTIVE I
To correct market inefficiencies?
– caused by deviations from ‘perfect competition’
• monopoly, externalities, uncertainty, opportunistic behaviour
– regulation increases efficiency (total welfare = sum of 
consumer and producer welfare) ‘objective’ measure
• but which efficiency - static (current period) vs dynamic (over 
time)
• information and uncertainty – cause inefficiencies and hamper 
the ability to devise appropriate corrections
REGULATORY OBJECTIVES II
To promote or protect the public welfare?
– subjective
– a justification for redistribution
– safety is an efficiency issue
• opportunity cost of saving a life
• who pays is a distributive issue 
Should redistribution occur even if it reduces total 
welfare?
– Kaldor-Hicks Criterion – if an action increases welfare, then 
the ‘winners’ could compensate the ‘losers’ and still leave 
nobody worse off (and at least somebody better off) even if 
the redistribution does not actually occur
REGULATORY OBJECTIVES III
To promote competition?
– Competition Law objective
– allocation of responsibilities an economic consideration: 
which is best-placed to promote pursuit of economic 
efficiency?
– generic courts vs specialist regulators?
To promote investment?
– Telecommunications Act 2006 objective
– who will invest?
• public investment has always been a potential ‘solution’ to 
‘market failure’ and a substitute for regulation
• private investment – must address risk and return incentives
WHAT IS COMPETITION?
A code of behavioural etiquette?
A process of strategic interaction?
A means to the end of increased efficiency?
REGULATORY OBJECTIVES IV
Which form of competition maximises efficiency?
– perfect competition 
• homogeneous product; perfect information; complete contracts
• infinitely large number of market participants 
• price = marginal cost; single price
• all participants are price-takers
– monopolistic competition 
• small number of participants; differentiated products
• high fixed, sunk costs => price tends to average cost
• market power a given; uncertainty; information asymmetries
• efficiency may be maximised with multiple prices
– dominant firm/competitive fringe
• dominant firm has least-cost technology
• fringe competitors can constrain losses arising from dominance
WHAT IS ‘REGULATED COMPETITION’?
IS ‘REGULATED COMPETITION’ FEASIBLE?
‘REGULATED COMPETITION’
To impose the artefacts of perfect competition on the 
industry (one means)?
– marginal cost pricing of artificially-standardised incumbent 
outputs
– increasing number of participants/decreasing incumbent 
market share as performance benchmark
To increase industry efficiency (the end)?
– recognising different underlying economic circumstances are 
counter-indicative to perfect competition
– rules to govern an industry-specific competitive process (the 
means)
– performance assessed by incremental increases in welfare
INCREASING EFFICIENCY IN NETWORK 
INDUSTRIES I
High fixed & sunk (irreversible) costs
– scale economies matter – the natural monopoly problem
– marginal cost pricing is never optimal
Mandatory unbundling at marginal cost (and even 
TSLRIC) prices reduces rather than increases 
efficiency
– short-run – cannot recover fixed costs
– long-run – falling costs - discourages innovation, new 
investment (the patents problem) –
– solution is restricting short-run competition

Monopolistically Competitive Equilibrium 
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
Entry means residual demand shrinks till zero profits: fixed costs really matter
pq-0.28q-F = 0     =>:  F=6.40 => n*=8,        (F=1.60 => n*=17) 
RISKS OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
Too much entry is possible with differentiated products
– entrants do not consider effect of their entry upon market 
share of other entrants (information problem)
– the problem is bigger the lower the fixed/sunk  costs
• greatest risk of excessive entry in ‘unbundled’ markets when 
entrants’ fixed costs are low (only their establishment costs) 
and incumbent bears all the fixed
But not enough entry when fixed costs are very high 
and all entrants must bear the full extent of fixed 
costs alone
INCREASING EFFICIENCY IN NETWORK 
INDUSTRIES II
Uncertainty increases risks
– how to incentivise investment in new technologies?
Timing of investment matters
– uncertainty => wait for more information
– but potential welfare lost while waiting
‘PROBLEM’ NOT UNIQUE TO NETWORK 
INDUSTRIES
Digital goods
– music, software, books
Professional services
– doctors, lawyers, accountants
Entertainment industries
– movie screenings, concerts, museums
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Shifts focus from supply-side to the demand-side
Take differing consumer valuations into account
High-valuers ‘subsidise’ low-valuers
Overcomes the ‘missing market’ problem (static efficiency) 
Brings forward time at which technology is made available 
(dynamic efficiency)
A common feature of deregulated network industries
– e.g. airlines
And used to be common in electricity, telecommunications
– Ramsey prices
PRICE DISCRIMINATION ENABLES EARLIER 
ADOPTION OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY
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BUT PRICE DISCRIMINATION IS PROHIBITED 
IN MOST REGULATORY REGIMES
Why?
BUNDLING, TYING AND PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Two goods
– a degree of market power in at least one is a given
– e.g. monopolistic competition: product preference => high m/share
Customers have different valuations for each of the two 
goods 
– but supplier does not know the individual valuations
Supply individually at a single price
– consumer will purchase both only if each is valued at or above the 
price
Supply as a bundle
– consumer will offset consumer surplus gained from the more 
valued good against the less-valued good in the bundle but not if 
offered alone 
– total welfare increased
Sky TV channels; newspapers etc.
BUNDLING, TYING AND BROADBAND 
UPTAKE: THE DEMAND-SIDE STORY
For the vast majority of consumers, the broadband 
connection is the lower-valued product in the bundle
– relatively elastic demand indicated in most studies 
(especially compared to telephony connection elasticity)
Triple and quadruple play
– increases range of products where greater individual 
valuations can be utilised 
Bundling can bring forward the time at which the 
infrastructure supporting the lower-valued product is 
invested in
– market power in applications (e.g. content copyright – where 
market power exists) to extract surplus to subsidise 
infrastructure costs
BUT STRUCTURAL SEPARATION INHIBITS 
EFFICIENCY-EHNANCING INFRASTRUCTURE 
INVESTMENT 
Netco (i.e. BT Openreach or Chorus or …..) 
– must supply at non-discriminatory prices
– cannot utilise margins on retail applications to offset 
infrastructure investment costs
– cannot extract margins from customers with the preferred 
applications who use the infrastructure
Asymmetric regulation 
The greater the degree of reliance upon the 
incumbent’s network, the greater the delay that can 
be expected in the timing of new network investment
Entrant Shares by Technology: United Kingdom
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Entrant Shares by Technology: Denmark
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HORIZONTAL DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN 
INFRASTRUCTURES
Market power in one infrastructure industry can be used to 
offset investment in another infrastructure industry
– e.g. power lines and fibre
Already occurring in New Zealand? 
– Wired Country (fibre/wireless)
– Northpower/TelstraClear
‘Open access’ rules on the Telco infrastructure no protection 
as power lines customers pay higher prices subsidising 
earlier fibre (Telco) investment/rollout
– ownership and risk allocation may be important
• if ‘LinesCo’ is a consumer co-op (bearing risks of demand 
uncertainty), would consumers willingly forego dividend/purchase
refunds to promote fibre rollout?
REGULATORY DILEMMAS
Which regulatory body will govern?
If ‘LinesCo’ (or any vertically integrated 
ISP/infrastructure company) can price discriminate 
but Telecom can’t, then competitors get  regulated 
advantage over Telecom in the investment in new 
technologies in those areas where a business case 
exists
MANDATORY SEPARATION DELAYS 
TEHNOLOGY DIFFUSION
Mobile handsets in Finland
– pre 2005 bundling handsets with monthly access accounts 
prohibited
– 2005 - average age of handset stock >2 yrs 9 months
– 2005 – restriction removed
– 2006 – average age of handset stock < 2 yrs 6 months
Practically all mobile phone use in Finland is voice calls
– handset demand very elastic
– calling market very much less elastic (and doesn’t require 
3G capabilities)
– subsidise handsets from calling => increase uptake of 3G 
connections
– 2005 – NZ 25% of connections 3G, Finland 2% (same 
number of connections per capita)
CONCLUSION
Impacts of regulation very much more than simply 
increasing competition (whatever that may be)
Structural solutions (e.g. separation) have substantial 
impact upon dynamic competition and investment
No longer confined to activities in single industries
Suggests a need to rethink role of industry-specific 
regulation
– increasing efficiency is the logical economic starting point
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